Tai-Bridge

Reading Taiwan

Defining the Debate: Taiwan in Focus

Here we curate some of the most influential essays, reports, and debates shaping international understanding of Taiwan’s political future. These analyses span a spectrum of views—from urgent calls for U.S. strategic clarity to measured warnings against escalation—but they all grapple with the core question: how should democratic nations respond to the growing threat from the Chinese Communist Party? Together, they map the evolving discourse around deterrence, sovereignty, and the fragile balance in the Taiwan Strait. Whether aligned with pro-sovereignty advocacy or cautious engagement, these pieces are essential reading for anyone serious about Taiwan’s place in the Indo-Pacific order.

Below are notable analyses from influential foreign policy and national security outlets, along with several widely referenced pieces on Taiwan. Each entry includes the title, author(s), publication, date, a brief summary, and the piece’s general rhetorical stance (ranging from strongly pro-Taiwan sovereignty to more cautious engagement).

  • Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy – Tsai Ing-wen, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2021. In this authoritative essay, Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen asserts Taiwan’s role as a bastion of liberal democracy in the face of authoritarian pressure. She describes how Taiwan’s free society and democratic values make it a “force for good” in the international order, and she calls for deeper cooperation with fellow democracies to resist coercion. Tsai emphasizes Taiwan’s determination to defend its democracy and way of life. Affirmed Position: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (strong liberal-democratic framing from Taiwan’s former leader).

  • “The hardliner” (Interview with Matt Pottinger) – James Crabtree, Mekong Review (November, 2024). An in-depth interview with Matt Pottinger (former U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser known for his hawkish China views) about the Taiwan crisis. Pottinger argues that China’s campaign against Taiwan is already underway and advocates a resolute response. He warns “the war, from Beijing’s perspective, has already started” and predicts China might attempt a swift “flash quarantine” of Taiwan’s waters to establish control. The conversation explores his hard-line approach to bolstering U.S. and Taiwanese defenses. Rhetorical positioning: Strongly pro-sovereignty/hawkish, emphasizing urgency in confronting Beijing’s aggression.

  • “Telling the Truth About Taiwan” – Eliot A. Cohen, The Atlantic (October 3, 2023). Cohen, a prominent strategist, argues that U.S. policy has been clouded by a “necessary lie” – the pretense that Taiwan is part of one China. He relates insights from a Taiwan visit and insists that it’s time to speak plainly: “Taiwan is an independent country… in every meaningful sense”, and the U.S. should openly acknowledge that fact. The article contends that American ambiguity only undermines deterrence and emboldens China. Rhetorical positioning: Pro-sovereignty and hawkish – urging clear support for Taiwan’s de facto independence and an end to polite fictions that, in Cohen’s view, endanger the island.

  • “Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Taiwan” – Elbridge Colby and Jim Mitre, War on the Rocks (Oct 7, 2020). Two former U.S. defense officials make the case that among all potential conflicts with China, a war over Taiwan should be the Pentagon’s top planning scenario. They argue that effectively defending Taiwan is vital to U.S. strategy because Taiwan’s fate is pivotal to China’s goal of regional hegemony . The article calls for reallocating U.S. military resources and planning toward a Taiwan contingency (over other scenarios) to credibly deter a Chinese invasion. **Rhetorical positioning: ** Strongly pro-Taiwan defense (hawkish) – emphasizes military preparedness and prioritizing Taiwan’s defense in U.S. strategy warontherocks.com .

  • “Is China Planning to Attack Taiwan? A Careful Consideration of Available Evidence Says No” – Timothy R. Heath, War on the Rocks (Dec 14, 2022) Security analyst Timothy Heath examines intelligence and military indicators and concludes that there is little evidence Beijing is poised to invade imminently. He notes alarmist warnings (e.g. about a 2027 timeline) but finds they often misread China’s intentions and internal debates. The piece urges observers not to overhype the threat, while still preparing prudently. Rhetorical positioning: Cautious/pragmatic – pushes back against panic, suggesting the risk of immediate war is overstated based on current evidence.

  • “Taiwan’s Most Pressing Challenge Is Strangulation, Not Invasion” – Jude Blanchette and Bonnie S. Glaser, War on the Rocks (Nov 9, 2023) Noted Asia experts Blanchette and Glaser argue that while a Chinese invasion would be catastrophic, Beijing is more likely to pursue “strangulation” tactics – political, economic, and gray-zone coercion – to wear down Taiwan rather than a full-scale attack in the near term. “While an invasion is the most consequential scenario, we do not think it is the most probable, and treating it as such distracts from near-term challenges,” they write. The article calls for countering China’s pressure campaign (propaganda, military posturing, economic coercion) now, as part of deterrence. Rhetorical positioning: Moderate/pro-deterrence, but with a focus on non-military forms of conflict – urging vigilance and pushback against coercion short of war rather than over-fixation on an invasion.

  • “U.S. Officials Need to Explain the Stakes in Taiwan” – Jake Yeager, War on the Rocks (Jan 17, 2025). Yeager contends that Washington has failed to communicate to the American public why Taiwan matters, undermining U.S. deterrence. He cites that only one-third of Americans can find Taiwan on a map, and most don’t realize why the U.S. might fight for it, leading to weak public resolve. The piece urges U.S. leaders to speak openly about Taiwan’s strategic importance (for global trade, democracy, and containing China) to build the domestic will needed to deter or, if necessary, win a protracted conflict. Rhetorical positioning: Pro-sovereignty and hawkish, stressing the need to bolster public support for defending Taiwan (as a means to strengthen deterrence against China).

  • “Disinformation, Annexation, & Deterrence: Why the CCP Is More Likely to Subvert Taiwan Than Invade” – Libby Lange and Doowan Lee, Lawfare (June 22, 2021). This analysis argues Beijing is more inclined to undermine Taiwan through political warfare, cyber operations, and misinformation than through an outright military invasion. Drawing parallels to Russia’s tactics, the authors highlight how the Chinese Communist Party might seek to “annex” Taiwan politically by influencing elections, sowing discord, and eroding Taiwanese will to resist. In their view, a “persistent yet deliberate political campaign to annex Taiwan is much more likely than a full-on military invasion”. They call for bolstering Taiwan’s resilience against subversion and for calibrated U.S. deterrence that doesn’t inadvertently provoke conflict. Rhetorical positioning: Cautious/analytical, focused on non-military threats – it implicitly warns against over-militarizing the issue and instead emphasizes countering Beijing’s subversive tactics.

  • “Deterrence Lawfare to Save Taiwan” – Amb. David Scheffer, Just Security (Aug 7, 2023). Ambassador Scheffer advocates an inventive diplomatic deterrent: he proposes that the United States should credibly threaten to formally recognize Taiwan as an independent state if China invades. While maintaining the One China policy in peacetime, Washington could use the prospect of recognition as a “weapon” to raise the stakes for Beijing. Scheffer writes that if China launches unprovoked aggression, it “would eviscerate the ‘one China’ policy” and force America’s hand to recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan). This threat, he argues, might deter China without requiring a prior security commitment. Rhetorical positioning: Pro-sovereignty but conditional – it threatens a dramatic pro-Taiwan move in response to Chinese aggression, while still counseling against unilateral independence moves absent an attack (a mix of hard deterrence and status-quo maintenance).

  • “China Watches, Taiwan Learns: Ukraine’s War and the Indo-Pacific” – Benedetta Girardi, Davis Ellison, and Tim Sweijs, The Diplomat (March 18, 2025). This piece distills lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for Taiwan’s defense. The authors find that Ukraine’s experience underscores the importance of a “hedgehog” strategy for Taiwan – a robust denial defense, asymmetric capabilities, and resilient command structures – combined with strong international support. They argue Taiwan must stockpile munitions, improve its reserve forces, and cultivate deeper ties with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and others to ensure it can hold out in a conflict. At the same time, diplomatic messaging is key: Taipei should leverage its democracy to rally global backing just as Ukraine did. Rhetorical positioning: Pro-deterrence and sovereignty, with a pragmatic tone – advocates military strengthening and alliance-building for Taiwan while also warning that pure military preparedness is insufficient without a united front of international assistance.

  • “The most dangerous place on Earth” – The Economist (May 1, 2021). This Economist cover story (an unsigned editorial) warns that Taiwan has become “the most dangerous place on Earth” due to the risk of U.S.-China war. It argues that decades of strategic ambiguity kept peace, but rising Chinese power and nationalism now threaten to upend the status quo. The piece urges both Washington and Beijing to work harder to avoid war over Taiwan’s future, stressing the need for careful deterrence and diplomacy. Rhetorical positioning: Cautionary and stability-focused (urging restraint to prevent a catastrophic war).

  • “Don’t Make Taiwan Our Newest Forever War” – Garrett Ehinger, Inkstick Media (March 14, 2023). A contrarian take warning against overcommitting U.S. forces to a Taiwan conflict. Ehinger argues that Taiwan can likely defend itself with continued U.S. arms sales and training, and that sending American troops would be counterproductive. He critiques voices in Washington who claim war with China is inevitable, saying such attitudes “only increase the odds of the United States needlessly going to war with China over Taiwan”. The article urges preserving “strategic ambiguity” (no clear defense pledge) to avoid provoking Beijing, while still helping Taiwan bolster its own defenses. Drawing parallels to Vietnam and Afghanistan, it cautions that a direct U.S.-China war over Taiwan could be disastrously costly. Rhetorical positioning: Cautious/restraint-focused – emphasizes avoiding a U.S. military entanglement (even as it supports arming Taiwan), essentially favoring engagement and deterrence short of any formal troop commitment.

Each of the above articles has influenced policy discussions on Taiwan. Together, they reflect a spectrum of views – from hawks calling for forthright support to voices urging caution to prevent an unwinnable war. All agree, however, that Taiwan’s status is a central strategic issue in the U.S.-China relationship, deserving careful thought and informed debate in the 2020s.

Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations)

  • Is Taiwan the Next Hong Kong? – Michael J. Green and Evan S. Medeiros, Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2020foreignaffairs.com. This essay warns that Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong foreshadows growing pressure on Taiwan. The authors argue that although a direct Chinese assault on Taiwan isn’t imminent, U.S. resolve is crucial to deter Chinese aggressionforeignaffairs.com. They note that Hong Kong’s fate galvanized Taiwanese public opinion against Beijing and that failure to respond firmly could make China conclude the risks of attacking Taiwan are tolerableforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (urges robust U.S. deterrence against Beijing).

  • American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous – Richard Haass and David Sacks, Foreign Affairs, Sept 2, 2020foreignaffairs.com. Haass and Sacks contend that Washington’s longstanding “strategic ambiguity” is now outdated. They call for “strategic clarity” – an explicit pledge to defend Taiwan – to prevent Chinese miscalculationforeignaffairs.com. By making U.S. intentions clear, they argue, China would be discouraged from using force, thus keeping the peace by removing any doubt that aggression would be met with a U.S. responseforeignaffairs.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (advocates a policy shift in favor of defending Taiwan).

  • The Overreach of the China Hawks – Michael D. Swaine, Ezra Vogel, J. Stapleton Roy, et al., Foreign Affairs, Oct 23, 2020foreignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. A group of veteran China scholars and former officials caution against an overly antagonistic U.S. stance toward Beijing. They argue that “aggression is the wrong response”foreignaffairs.com and that hardline policies could provoke the very conflict they seek to prevent. While acknowledging the challenge from China, they urge restraint and continued engagement to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait. (Notably, analyst Aaron Friedberg provided a rebuttal favoring a tougher lineforeignaffairs.com.) Lean: Status-quo engagement (skeptical of hawkish policies; favors caution to avoid war).

  • The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force – Oriana Skylar Mastro, Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 2021foreignaffairs.com. Mastro argues that U.S. policymakers must “take seriously the possibility” of a Chinese attack on Taiwan in the foreseeable future. She outlines Beijing’s growing capabilities and nationalist drive, warning that China could decide to use force if it perceives a narrowing window to achieve unification. The article contends that enhanced U.S. and Taiwanese deterrence is needed to convince Beijing that war would be too costly. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (raises alarm about Chinese aggression to spur stronger deterrence).

  • Taiwan Can’t Wait: What America Must Do to Prevent a Successful Chinese Invasion – Mike Gallagher, Foreign Affairs, (Jan/Feb, 2022) Former Congressman (and former chair of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party) Gallagher argues that the U.S. must accelerate efforts to arm and assist Taiwan’s defense immediately. He warns that China’s military threat is growing and that delays or half-measures could invite aggression. Key recommendations include expanding arms sales, strengthening U.S.–Taiwan ties, and hardening regional alliances – essentially turning Taiwan into a “porcupine” that China cannot swallow. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (urgent, hawkish call to bolster Taiwan’s defenses).

  • Time Is Running Out to Defend Taiwan: Why the Pentagon Must Focus on Near-Term Deterrence – Michèle A. Flournoy and Michael A. Brown, Foreign Affairs, Sept 14, 2022foreignaffairs.com. Former defense official Flournoy and Brown argue that the window to deter a Chinese attack is rapidly closing. They urge the Pentagon to prioritize Taiwan’s defense now, rather than in distant future plans. Steps include dispersing U.S. forces in Asia, surging Taiwanese asymmetric warfare capabilities, and stocking precision munitionsforeignaffairs.com. Their premise is that a strong immediate deterrent is the best way to convince Beijing that war would fail. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (hawkish emphasis on urgent military preparedness).

  • America Must Prepare for a War Over Taiwan – Elbridge Colby, Foreign Affairs, Aug 10, 2022foreignaffairs.com. Colby (a former U.S. defense strategist) bluntly asserts that the U.S. is not doing enough to get ready for a potential war in the Taiwan Straitforeignaffairs.com. He argues that robust preparations – from fortifying U.S. bases and forces in Asia to intensifying joint planning with Taiwan – are paradoxically the best way to prevent war, by making U.S. intervention credible and victory achievable. Colby’s piece insists that without serious preparation, deterrence will fail. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (very hawkish, prioritizing military readiness to deter China).

  • The Upside of Pelosi’s Unwise Taiwan Visit – Ryan Hass, Foreign Affairs, Aug 4, 2022. Written just after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taipei, this analysis acknowledges Beijing’s fury and military drills, but highlights a silver liningforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. Hass argues that the crisis sparked by the visit could prod Washington and Taipei to coordinate more closely on defense and crisis managementforeignaffairs.com. He maintains that while the visit was a diplomatic misstep, it underscored the need for steadier U.S. policy and might ultimately lead to clearer “guardrails” to manage U.S.-China tensions. Lean: Status-quo engagement (critical of provocations and supportive of cautious U.S. diplomacy, though still favoring strong de facto support for Taiwan).

  • Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan – Andrew J. Nathan, Foreign Affairs, Aug 19, 2022. China expert Andrew Nathan argues that despite fiery rhetoric, Beijing’s preferred approach toward Taiwan remains gradualist. He explains that Xi Jinping is patient – bolstering China’s power and applying steady pressure on Taiwan, but stopping short of war unless absolutely compelled. Nathan suggests the U.S. should likewise avoid panic and continue a long-term strategy of deterring aggression without provoking Beijingforeignaffairs.com.

  • Lean: Status-quo engagement (emphasizes patience and avoiding alarmism, aligning with a cautious approach to maintain stability).

  • How to Survive the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis – David Sacks, Foreign Affairs, Oct 28, 2022. In the wake of China’s unprecedented military drills around Taiwan in 2022, Sacks lays out a playbook for navigating future crises. He urges U.S. officials to communicate early with Beijing to prevent miscalculations, strengthen military hotlines, and support Taiwan in building resilient communications and civil defenses. Sacks emphasizes crisis-management and alliance unity to ensure that the next flare-up ends without warforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. Lean: Status-quo engagement (focuses on de-escalation and communication, within a framework of continued support for Taiwan).

  • The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution – Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass, Foreign Affairs, Dec 20, 2022foreignaffairs.com. Blanchette and Hass argue that the Taiwan question cannot be resolved in the near term without risking war, so the least-bad option is to maintain the uneasy status quoforeignaffairs.com. They contend that attempts at a grand solution – whether formal independence or forced unification – would likely trigger conflict, whereas continued strategic ambiguity and incremental support for Taiwan’s security can preserve peace. Their essay essentially advocates for “kicking the can down the road,” giving all sides time and space to avert disaster. Lean: Status-quo engagement (explicitly favors patience and avoiding dramatic policy shifts, to prevent conflict).

  • Don’t Panic About Taiwan: Alarm Over a Chinese Invasion Could Become a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy – Jessica Chen Weiss, Foreign Affairs, Mar 21, 2023foreignaffairs.com. Weiss cautions that exaggerated fear of an imminent Taiwan war may itself inflame tensions. She notes that Beijing’s aggressive posturing often responds to perceived moves toward Taiwan’s independence or stronger U.S.-Taiwan ties, and that panic-driven actions in Washington could provoke the crisis they seek to preventforeignaffairs.com. She advocates for firm but measured policies: continue arms sales and diplomacy, but avoid public hype and unilateral steps that corner Beijing. Lean: Status-quo engagement (urges moderation and warns against hawkish overreaction that could trigger war).

  • The Taiwan Catastrophe: What America—and the World—Would Lose If China Took the Island – Andrew S. Erickson, Gabriel B. Collins, and Matt Pottinger, Foreign Affairs, Feb 16, 2024andrewerickson.com. This stark analysis enumerates the global stakes of a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. The authors argue it would be a geopolitical and economic catastrophe: Taiwan’s democracy would be extinguished, U.S. credibility would plummet, and China would gain a strategic edge (dominating semiconductor supply chains and extending its military reach into the Pacific)foreignaffairs.comandrewerickson.com. They paint a vivid picture of how a successful invasion would shatter the “U.S.-led international order” and embolden authoritarian powersforeignaffairs.comandrewerickson.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (underscores the liberal-democratic and strategic imperatives of preventing Taiwan’s fall).

  • How to Toughen Up Taiwan – Daniel Byman and Seth G. Jones, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2025 (snapshot). Byman and Jones focus on fortifying Taiwan’s self-defense and resilience. They recommend measures such as improving Taiwan’s reserve forces, acquiring large stocks of mobile anti-ship and anti-air weapons, and training civilians in civil defense. Their core argument is that Taiwan must become a “harder target” – politically unified and militarily prepared – to raise the costs of any Chinese attackaspi.org.auaspi.org.au. Strengthening deterrence in this way, in concert with U.S. support, could convince Beijing that force would not succeed. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (emphasizes boosting Taiwan’s defensive capabilities to deter China).

  • “How to Prevent an Accidental War Over Taiwan” – Bonny Lin & David Sacks (Nov/Dec 2021). With Chinese military flights near Taiwan at record highsforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com, the authors warn that a mishap or miscalculation (a mid-air collision or mistaken shoot-down) could spiral into conflict. They urge crisis communication and confidence-building measures to avert unintended escalation in the Strait.

  • “China’s Gray-Zone Offensive Against Taiwan Is Backfiring” – David Sacks (Sept/Oct 2024). Analyzes Beijing’s pattern of coercive “gray-zone” tactics – military drills, economic embargoes (like the 2022 pineapple ban), cyber attacks – and concludes they have only strengthened Taiwanese resolve and international support for Taipeiforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. Sacks argues Washington and Taipei must be prepared for further escalation of these tactics even as they unite others to push back.

  • “The Looming Crisis in the Taiwan Strait” – Bonnie S. Glaser & Bonny Lin (Nov/Dec 2024). Focuses on the aftermath of Taiwan’s 2024 election. With new President Lai Ching-te explicitly affirming Taiwan’s sovereign status (the first Taiwanese leader to do so at inauguration)foreignaffairs.com, and Beijing responding with menacing military drills, the authors contend U.S. diplomacy should aim to lower the temperature. They recommend maintaining the One-China policy while quietly helping Taipei strengthen its defenses and international partnerships to navigate a very fragile moment.

  • Debate: “Strait of Emergency? Debating Beijing’s Threat to Taiwan” (Aug 2021). A roundtable of essays responding to Mastro’s Taiwan Temptation piece:

“Don’t Fall for the Invasion Panic” – Rachel Esplin Odell & Eric Heginbotham. These analysts argue China is unlikely to invade soon absent provocation, noting the formidable risks and remaining PLA weaknessesforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com.

  • “Force Is Still a Last Resort” – Bonny Lin & David Sacks. Emphasizes that Beijing prefers coercion over outright war; Xi will use force only if “backed into a corner.” They believe U.S. support to Taiwan should be confident but not needlessly provocativeforeignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com.

  • “Xi Doesn’t Need Taiwan” – Kharis Templeman. Templeman posits that Xi Jinping’s legitimacy does not depend on taking Taiwan in the near term. He suggests China can afford to be patient and that alarmism plays into Beijing’s hands by undermining Taiwanese confidence.

  • “Mastro Replies” – Oriana Skylar Mastro. In her rebuttal, Mastro maintains that her colleagues may underestimate Xi’s determination and the PLA’s growing capability. She reiterates that deterrence will require stronger action, as a more powerful China could decide to strike before U.S. alliances and Taiwanese defenses grow even strongerforeignaffairs.com.

(Foreign Affairs has published many Taiwan-related pieces; all significant analyses from 2020 onward are included above. In general, Foreign Affairs has featured a vigorous debate between two camps: writers aligned with the U.S. establishment who counsel caution and maintaining the status quo, and others who urge more decisive support for Taiwan’s security and democracy. This divide is reflected in the “Lean” noted for each article.)

Foreign Policy (Magazine)

  • Taiwan Is More Than a Pawn to Be Sacrificed to China – Hilton Yip, Foreign Policy, Oct 28, 2020foreignpolicy.com. Yip criticizes any notion of “trading” Taiwan’s interests for better relations with Beijing. He argues Taiwan is a vibrant democracy whose fate should not be bargained away. The article emphasizes Taiwan’s intrinsic value as a free society and strategic partner, urging Washington and others to stand firm against China’s coercion. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (strongly rejects realpolitik compromises at Taiwan’s expense).

  • Why Doesn’t China Invade Taiwan? – James Palmer, Foreign Policy, Aug 10, 2022foreignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Palmer explores the reasons a full-scale invasion remains “a risky endeavor” for Beijingforeignpolicy.com. He notes that Chinese officials believe they can coerce or isolate Taiwan into submission over time, rather than fight a war. The piece highlights factors deterring an invasion: the PLA’s amphibious limitations, the uncertain outcome, and catastrophic economic falloutforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Palmer’s conclusion is that Beijing finds gray-zone pressure preferable to a high-stakes attack – at least for now. Lean: Status-quo engagement (downplays imminent invasion and implies that steady deterrence, not panic, is the right approach).

  • China’s Taiwan Invasion Plans May Get Faster and Deadlier – Bonny Lin and John Culver, Foreign Policy, Apr 19, 2022foreignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Written after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this analysis considers lessons Beijing might learn. Lin and Culver, both veteran analysts, conclude that while the Ukraine war hasn’t made China more willing to invade Taiwan, it likely is teaching the PLA to strike harder and quicker if it ever didforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. To avoid protracted resistance like Russia faced, China could plan overwhelming, fast action – including early use of force against U.S. forces or a blockade. However, they also note Beijing sees time on its side and is not rushing into a conflictforeignpolicy.com. Lean: Status-quo engagement (analytical tone; suggests strengthening deterrence but also that China is cautious post-Ukraine).

  • Taiwan Needs Weapons for Day 1 of a Chinese Invasion – Blake Herzinger, Foreign Policy, Sept 8, 2022foreignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Herzinger argues that, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan cannot expect to be resupplied easily during a war due to a likely Chinese blockadeforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Therefore, Taiwan and the U.S. must ensure Taiwan is fully armed before any conflict starts. He points out bureaucratic and production delays that have left Taiwan waiting on important U.S. weaponry, and calls for urgent remedies (expediting arms deliveries, stockpiling munitions on the island, etc.). Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (hawkish in pushing for maximal arming of Taiwan as a deterrent).

  • U.S. Deterrence in Taiwan Is Failing – Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, Sept 8, 2023foreignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Brands delivers a stark warning that current efforts to deter China are inadequate. He recounts how war fears spiked after Pelosi’s 2022 visit and Chinese war games, and notes U.S. officials increasingly predict a conflict by the mid-2020sforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. To bolster deterrence, Brands prescribes a multi-pronged approach: “deterrence by denial” (making Taiwan militarily indigestible) combined with “deterrence by punishment” (credibly threatening severe economic and diplomatic costs to China)foreignpolicy.com. Without rapid improvements – more regional forces, fortified alliances, and solving the U.S. munitions backlog – he argues the risk of war will keep risingforeignpolicy.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (calls for a much stronger military posture to safeguard Taiwan).

  • The U.S. Is Getting Taiwan Ready to Fight on the Beaches – Jack Detsch and Zinya Salfiti, Foreign Policy, Nov 8, 2021. This reported piece reveals that the U.S. quietly maintained small military training teams in Taiwan for yearsforeignpolicy.com, and under both Trump and Biden ramped up a “porcupine strategy” to harden Taiwan’s defensesforeignpolicy.com. It describes efforts to train Taiwanese troops in guerilla tactics and coastal defense, strengthen asymmetric warfare capabilities, and pre-position defensive equipment. The article underscores a bipartisan U.S. resolve to make Taiwan less vulnerable to invasion. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (favors intensive U.S. support to fortify Taiwan’s defense).

  • “Taiwan’s COVID-19 Success Is Worryingly Smug” – Hilton Yip (April 2021). While praising Taiwan’s pandemic triumph, Yip argues it bred complacency in Taipei about the looming threat from Chinaforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. He warns that military readiness and economic diversification lagged as Taiwanese enjoyed “normal life” in 2020 – a dangerous gap given Chinese jets crossing the Strait’s median line and U.S. admirals warning of invasion within 6 yearsforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com.

  • “Taiwan Deserves to Be a Normal Country” – Salvatore Babones (Jan 2020). Written after Tsai’s election victory, this opinion piece insists the world stop “playing games” about Taiwan’s statusforeignpolicy.com. Babones argues Taiwan functions as a sovereign nation and should be treated as such – advocating greater official recognition and saying the fiction of ROC vs PRC only undermines Taiwanese democracy.

  • “As U.S. Hardens Line on Beijing, Taiwan’s Stock Rises in Washington” – Robbie Gramer (May 2021). Reports how bipartisan support for Taiwan was growing in DC. High-profile figures like Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley, eyeing 2024, made a point of meeting Taiwan’s envoy Bi-khim Hsiao (over dried pineapple snacks)foreignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Gramer shows that amid worsening U.S.-China relations, Taiwan has gained unprecedented influence in U.S. policy circles.

  • “Taiwan and China Are Locked in Economic Co-Dependence” – Bonnie Glaser & Jeremy Mark (April 2021). This analysis examines why Beijing has been cautious in wielding trade as a weapon against Taipei. Despite political animosity, cross-strait trade hit record highs and supply chains (especially semiconductors) bind them togetherforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. The authors note China’s rare sanctions (like the fruit ban) largely backfired, as Taiwan found other buyers, illustrating a mutual economic restraint that so far tempers the conflict.

  • “Why China Won’t Back Off Taiwan” – James Palmer (Oct 2021). In FP’s China Brief, deputy editor Palmer recounts Xi and Tsai’s dueling National Day speeches after a spike in PLA incursionsforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. Xi reiterated calls for “peaceful reunification,” but Palmer explains why any concessions to Taipei are politically untenable for Beijing. He underscores that China’s internal politics and nationalist public leave Xi little room to ease up on Taiwan.

  • “Biden Struggles to Stick to the Script on Taiwan” – Amy Mackinnon & Anna Weber (Nov 2021). A Foreign Policy report observing that President Biden publicly “misspoke” at least four times by saying the U.S. would defend Taiwanforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. While the White House walked back each comment, experts cited here debate whether Biden is deliberately inching toward clarity or simply gaffing – and how these mixed messages risk “igniting a wider conflict” if misinterpreted in Beijing or Taipei.

  • “Threatening Taiwan Gets China More Than Invading It Would” – A. A. Bastian (Nov 2021). A historian’s provocative argument that Beijing has found intimidation more fruitful than actual invasionforeignpolicy.com. By keeping Taiwan under constant threat – from missile drills to diplomatic isolation – China sows fear and extracts concessions (e.g. poaching Taiwan’s allies, deterring formal independence) without the enormous costs of war. Bastian concludes that as long as the threat of force suffices, China will likely refrain from the real thing.

  • “Taiwan Doesn’t Need a Formal U.S. Security Guarantee” – Ivan Kanapathy (April 2022). This FP Argument piece pushes back against calls to replace “strategic ambiguity” with an official defense pact. Kanapathy, a former U.S. Indo-Pacific staffer, argues existing U.S. laws (Taiwan Relations Act) and robust security cooperation already provide substantial deterrenceforeignpolicy.comforeignpolicy.com. In fact, he warns a formal treaty could reduce deterrence by drawing rigid red lines (inviting Beijing to exploit any gaps, like Taiwan’s offshore islandsforeignpolicy.com) and potentially encouraging complacency in Taipei’s own defense effortsforeignpolicy.com. In essence, U.S. commitment is better shown through deeds – arms sales, training, diplomacy – than new declarations.

(Foreign Policy’s coverage has combined news reporting with pointed arguments. Generally, its analyses acknowledge the rising danger in the Taiwan Strait but differ on urgency: some emphasize immediate deterrence and arms for Taiwan, while others counsel that Beijing is not on the verge of invasion, advocating steadiness over alarm.)

The Atlantic

  • Taiwan Prepares to Be Invaded – Ben Rhodes, The Atlantic, December 2022theatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Former U.S. Deputy NSA Ben Rhodes recounts his meetings with President Tsai Ing-wen and Taiwanese officials as tensions mounted in 2022. The article outlines how Taiwan is walking a tightrope: arming itself with “porcupine” defenses and mobilizing civilian reservists, yet projecting calm resolve to avoid provoking Beijingtheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Rhodes highlights Tsai’s strategy of quietly bolstering defenses (like investing in anti-ship missiles and greater reserve training) so that “Xi has to think twice” about an attacktheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. He conveys Taiwan’s determination to uphold its democracy, as well as the enormous stakes for the U.S. and world if war comes (the piece notes a conflict over Taiwan could draw the U.S. into a direct war with a nuclear-armed superpower)theatlantic.com. Lean: Status-quo engagement (supports strengthening Taiwan’s defense and U.S. commitments, but in a measured way that avoids outright provocation; reflects mainstream U.S. policy aims).

  • Taiwan Has a Trump Problem – Michael Schuman, The Atlantic, Oct 25, 2024theatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Schuman examines how a potential return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency worries Taipei. He explains that Trump’s “America First” skepticism of defending allies could “undo the central promise sustaining today’s international order” – namely, U.S. willingness to defend partners like Taiwantheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. The article details Taiwan’s own military shortcomings (poor training, aging systems) and argues that uncertainty over U.S. help – intensified by Trump’s ambiguous statements – could embolden Beijing or undermine deterrencetheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. In essence, Schuman warns that Taipei must prepare to rely more on itself, and that U.S. credibility is a linchpin of cross-strait peace. Lean: Status-quo engagement (defends the traditional U.S. security guarantee as vital, implicitly criticizing any retreat from it).

  • I Went to Taiwan to Say Goodbye – Katherine Hu, The Atlantic, January/February 2023 issue (published Dec 18, 2022)theatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. In this poignant personal essay, a Taiwanese American writer travels to Taiwan amid global talk of war to visit her ailing grandmother. Hu reflects on the island’s normalcy and resilience even as Chinese military drills and aggressive rhetoric spike in the newstheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. She finds that everyday life in Taipei remains calm – people carry on, seemingly “numb” to threattheatlantic.com. The piece illustrates the psychological burden on ordinary Taiwanese of living under constant menace, yet not succumbing to fear. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (emphasizes Taiwan’s human story and democratic resilience; implicitly critical of Beijing’s intimidation).

(The Atlantic’s coverage has ranged from policy analysis to personal narratives. It tends to highlight the values at stake – democracy vs. authoritarianism – and the importance of credible U.S. support, while also noting the need to avoid missteps that could trigger war.)

The Economist and Financial Times

  • “The Most Dangerous Place on Earth” – The Economist, May 1, 2021. This influential cover story (and accompanying briefing) declares that the Taiwan Strait has become the world’s most perilous geopolitical flashpoint. The Economist argues that China’s military buildup and nationalist fervor, combined with U.S. commitments to Taiwan, pose a real risk of war – one that could upend the global economy and security order. The piece urges Western nations to strengthen military deterrence around Taiwan while clearly communicating to Beijing that an invasion would have dire consequencesaspi.org.auaspi.org.au. At the same time, it counsels against unnecessary provocations. The stark framing of Taiwan as “dangerous” galvanized discussion in 2021 about bolstering defenses and diplomacy to keep peace. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (calls for robust deterrence of China, from a Western establishment viewpoint).

  • US Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan Won’t Work Any Longer – Financial Times editorial (by Gideon Rachman), 2021. This FT piece echoes the sentiment that the old policy of ambiguity is becoming untenableft.com. It argues that given China’s growing power and assertiveness, the U.S. may eventually need to state clearly it would defend Taiwan to preserve deterrence. Rachman notes that ambiguity helped keep peace in past decades, but suggests that clarity (backed by military readiness) might now better serve that causeft.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (coming from a mainstream source urging a shift toward a stronger stance).

  • The Battlegrounds That Could Decide a U.S.-China War Over Taiwan – Christian Shepherd and Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times (interactive report), Nov 2022. This in-depth FT analysis identifies five key domains in a possible war – including aerial combat over the Taiwan Strait, missile duels, undersea warfare, cyber attacks, and the battle for global narrativesig.ft.com. It draws on war-game insights to illustrate how, for example, control of the air and seas around Taiwan would be decisive, and how Taiwan’s mountainous terrain could favor defenders if an invasion force lands. The report underscored the sobering reality that a conflict would be devastating and finely poised, not a quick Chinese victory. Lean: (Analytical, implicitly pro-deterrence by revealing the serious difficulties China would face in war).

  • Taiwan’s “Everywhere War” – Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, March 2023. FT’s Taipei bureau chief Hille portrays how Taiwan is fighting a constant, low-level “everywhere war” against Chinese pressure short of actual fighting. This includes daily cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns on social media, diplomatic isolation, and military aircraft incursions. One vivid profile is of a Taiwanese soldier leveraging online influence to counter defeatist narratives at homeft.com. The article demonstrates Taiwan’s multifaceted strategy to boost societal resilience – from civil defense drills to patriotic education – showing that modern conflict is as much about morale and information as missiles. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (sympathetic to Taiwan’s plight and applauding its society for pushing back against Chinese hybrid warfare).

(The Economist and FT have sounded the alarm on Taiwan while still reflecting establishment perspectives. They often stress the need for stronger Western resolve and military preparedness, framing Taiwan as a litmus test for the global balance of power. However, they also analyze the nuance of deterrence and caution against steps that could spark the war everyone is trying to prevent.)

Think Tanks, Reports, and Academic Perspectives

  • “U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China” – Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report, June 2023. A bipartisan CFR task force (co-chaired by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and former Defense Official Kelly Magsamen) concluded that Taiwan is “critical to U.S. interests” and recommended expanding economic and diplomatic ties with Taipei while maintaining the One-China policythechinaproject.comenglish.president.gov.tw. The report urged sharpening U.S. deterrence (including “clarifying” U.S. intent to defend Taiwan) and strengthening Taiwan’s ability to withstand Chinese coercion. It warned that China’s more coercive approach under Xi requires the United States to deepen its commitment to Taiwan or risk peace in the Indo-Pacific. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (though written in sober policy language, it aligns with bolstering Taiwan’s security and international support).

  • Wargaming a Chinese Invasion – “The First Battle of the Next War” – Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report by Mark Cancian et al., January 2023. CSIS ran a large series of war-game simulations for a hypothetical 2026 Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The widely publicized finding: If the U.S. and Japan intervene, a Chinese invasion could be defeated, but at an enormous costforeignaffairs.com. In most scenarios Taiwan survives as a de facto self-governing entity, but U.S. forces lose dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft, Taiwan’s economy is devastated, and China’s navy and air force are gutted. The report emphasizes urgent steps to improve deterrence – such as investing in more long-range anti-ship missiles, hardening U.S. bases in Guam and Japan, and ensuring Taiwan stockpiles supplies. Its sobering conclusion is that “there is no cheap victory” – all sides would pay dearlyandrewerickson.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (supports strong allied defense of Taiwan, highlighting the need to prepare for high-intensity conflict to deter China).

  • “Limited Quarantine” – Likely China’s First Move (ASPI) – Jane Rickards, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Jan 13, 2025aspi.org.auaspi.org.au. This analysis from ASPI’s The Strategist argues that Beijing might not begin a Taiwan conquest with an outright blitzkrieg, but rather with a so-called “limited quarantine.” Rickards explains that China could impose a partial blockade – for example, barring certain goods or obstructing ships to one Taiwanese port – using civilian or coast guard vessels to blur the line between civil action and military aggressionaspi.org.auaspi.org.au. Such a step, she notes, offers Beijing advantages: it tests Western response, avoids a clear act of war, and could incrementally squeeze Taiwan. The piece, citing a CSIS study, calls on the West to think through responses to this grey-zone tactic, lest China slowly normalize a stranglehold on Taiwan without firing a shotaspi.org.auaspi.org.au. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (alerts democracies to a subtle Chinese threat and implies they must be ready to resist even “nominally civil” coercion).

  • Operation “MIST” – Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) campaign, 2024. IPAC – a global cross-party alliance of legislators focused on countering CCP challenges – launched Operation MIST in March 2024, a campaign to make governments assess the economic shock likely from a Taiwan Strait crisisipac.global. This initiative directly pushes back on arguments like French President Macron’s claim that Taiwan is “not our conflict.” IPAC gathered lawmakers from 14 countries in a video to underscore that a war or blockade around Taiwan would have trillions in economic costs worldwideipac.globalipac.global. By spotlighting studies (e.g. a Rhodium Group report) that a Taiwan blockade could cost the global economy $2.5–10 trillionipac.global, IPAC’s campaign frames Taiwan’s security as a shared democratic interest. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (firmly aligns international democratic opinion in solidarity with Taiwan).

  • “Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan” – Brendan R. Green and Caitlin Talmadge, International Security (academic journal), Summer 2022direct.mit.edu. In this scholarly analysis, Green and Talmadge examine how much capturing Taiwan would boost China’s military position. They conclude that possession of Taiwan would significantly improve China’s ability to threaten U.S. forces in the region – especially by expanding China’s submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilitiesbelfercenter.org. For instance, a mainland-controlled Taiwan could serve as a “power-projection springboard” into the Pacific and make it easier for the PLA Navy to target U.S. warships and undersea cables. Their finding that Chinese control of Taiwan would tilt the military balance echoes in their Foreign Affairs essay “The Consequences of Conquest”foreignaffairs.comforeignaffairs.com. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (their strategic analysis underscores why Taiwan is crucial to Indo-Pacific power dynamics and implicitly why the U.S. must deny China this prize).

  • “The Taiwan Story: How a Small Island Will Shape the Future” – Kerry Brown, 2023 (book and commentary). Scholarly observer Kerry Brown argues that stalemate might paradoxically be the best outcome for nowft.com. In FT and academic forums reviewing Brown’s workft.com, the case is made that neither unification nor independence is achievable at acceptable cost in the near term. Thus, managing the rivalry – through deterrence, dialogue, and economic resilience – is the only viable path. Brown’s framing is that Taiwan’s fate will be determined not just by superpower posturing but also by Taiwan’s own vibrant society and political choices (e.g. maintaining the status quo that preserves its de facto autonomy). Lean: Status-quo engagement (advocates patience and “creative ambiguity” as the least risky course).

  • Heritage Foundation – “The American Case for Taiwan” – Walter Lohman et al., Oct 2022. This conservative think-tank report makes a forceful argument that defending Taiwan is squarely in U.S. national interestsheritage.org. It outlines Taiwan’s role in the global economy (especially semiconductors), its democratic identity, and its strategic location controlling the “first island chain.” The Heritage report recommends expanding U.S. military aid and planning for Taiwan, strengthening Taiwan’s international participation, and ending any equivocation about U.S. defense commitments. It pointedly rejects the idea of ever pressuring Taiwan into a settlement with Beijing. Lean: Pro-Taiwan sovereignty (firmly on the hawkish end, aligning with views of officials like Matt Pottinger or ex-Secretary Mike Pompeo that Taiwan is a linchpin of the free world’s security).

(Across think tanks and academic circles, there is a consensus that the Taiwan situation has become more perilous as China’s power grows. The pro-Taiwan camp (Heritage, many at CSIS, IPAC, etc.) emphasizes strengthening deterrence – through arms, clarity of commitment, and global coalition-building – often invoking the moral imperative to support a fellow democracy. The more status-quo or cautious camp (some at Quincy Institute, certain academia, etc.) agrees Taiwan should be supported but warns that overt moves (like abandoning ambiguity or provoking Beijing with symbolic changes) could spark the conflict we seek to avoid. Nonetheless, even the cautious analysts generally underscore that Taiwan’s freedom is crucial and urge creative ways to bolster its security without crossing China’s red lines.)

The New York Times

  • Opinion: Nancy Pelosi, Please Don’t Go to Taiwan – Thomas L. Friedman (Aug 2022). Friedman cautions that Pelosi’s visit could dangerously escalate U.S.-China tensions, arguing it is “recklessly” provocative. (NYT Opinion)

  • Opinion: We Must Defend Taiwan – Whatever the Cost – Bret Stephens (Oct 2021). A hawkish call for strategic clarity, contending that the U.S. should signal it will militarily defend Taiwan to deter Beijing. (NYT Opinion)

  • News Analysis: China’s War Games Simulate a Blockade of Taiwan – Chris Buckley and Amy Qin (Aug 2022). Explores how Beijing’s unprecedented live-fire drills after Pelosi’s trip herald a “new era of coercion” over Taiwan, sharpening the risk of conflict. (NYT News Analysis)

  • News Analysis: A Simulation of War Over Taiwan – David E. Sanger (Jan 2023). Reporting on Pentagon war games that suggest a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be extremely costly for all sides, underscoring why deterrence is vital. (NYT News)

  • Editorial: The U.S. and China Need to Dial Down the Taiwan Rhetoric. The NYT Editorial Board urges careful diplomacy and continued “strategic ambiguity” to avoid miscalculation while supporting Taiwan’s democracy. (NYT Editorial)

The Washington Post

  • Op-Ed: In a Conflict With China, Check Your Cold War Playbook on Taiwan – David Shullman & Charles Edel (Nov 2021). Argues that to deter China, the U.S. should strengthen alliances (as in the Cold War), bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and communicate resolve without abandoning the One-China framework. (WP Op-Ed)

  • Op-Ed: Taiwan Needs Arms, Not Ambiguity – Josh Rogin (April 2022). Calls on Washington to expedite arms deliveries and military training for Taiwan, warning that “time is running out” to ensure Taiwan can defend itself. (WP Opinion)

  • Editorial: The U.S. Must Prevent War Over Taiwan. The Washington Post Editorial Board emphasizes firm support for Taiwan’s security and democracy, while urging direct dialogue with Beijing to reduce the risk of a catastrophic miscalculation. (WP Editorial)

  • Analysis: China’s Covert Campaign in Taiwan – Christian Shepherd (Nov 2021). Details how Chinese espionage and disinformation have intensified in Taiwanx.com, aiming to undermine Taipei’s resolve without open conflict. (WP reporting)

  • Outlook: Taiwan’s Lesson From Ukraine – Editorial Board (Mar 2022). Observes that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia has galvanized Taiwan to fortify its defenses and deepen ties with U.S. allies, even as Beijing doubles down on intimidation. (WP Outlook)

The Atlantic

  • Taiwan’s New President Is No Friend of Beijing – Thomas Wright (Jan 2020). Written after Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide re-election, this piece explains how Hong Kong’s crackdown steeled Taiwanese voters against Beijing’s “one country, two systems” modeltheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com, and what Tsai’s victory means for cross-strait relations.

  • The World Is Fed Up With China’s Belligerence – Chris Horton (Nov 2021). Explores a global shift toward deeper ties with Taiwan as democracies tire of placating an “aggressive Beijing.” Horton notes that moves once feared to “anger China” are now more common as countries expand unofficial relations with Taipeitheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • What Will Drive China to War? – Michael Beckley & Hal Brands (Nov 2021). A strategic essay warning that Beijing could resort to force if it perceives a closing window to absorb Taiwan. Drawing on historical patterns, the authors argue China is most dangerous when it fears losing its chance at unificationtheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • China Is Watching Ukraine With a Lot of Interest – Michael Schuman (Jan 2022). Analyzes how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine served as a “crucial test” for Xi Jinpingtheatlantic.com. Beijing is gauging U.S. resolve and international unity to inform its Taiwan calculus, making Ukraine a proxy scenario for deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

  • What Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Trip Says About China – Michael Schuman (July 2022). Written just before Pelosi’s visit, this piece explains why Beijing’s furious reaction (including threats of force) reveals Xi’s need for a new Taiwan strategy. China’s overreaction, Schuman argues, highlights how its coercion is backfiringtheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • The Gamble of Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan – Michael Schuman (Aug 2022). Assesses the immediate aftermath of Pelosi’s trip: Taipei celebrated, Beijing seethed. Schuman warns this visit likely marks the start of a new crisis, with China using it as a pretext to normalize more aggressive military posturing around Taiwantheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • No More ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ on Taiwan – Michael Schuman (Sept 2022). Contends that President Biden’s repeated assertions that the U.S. would defend Taiwan signal a de facto shift toward “strategic clarity.” Schuman agrees it’s time to shed ambiguity, given China’s growing aggression, and to back words with strengthening U.S.-Taiwan tiestheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • Taiwan Prepares to Be Invaded – Ben Rhodes (Dec 2022). A deeply reported feature (from The Atlantic’s Dec. 2022 issue) based on interviews with President Tsai Ing-wentheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Rhodes describes how Taiwan is boosting its “porcupine” defenses – stockpiling missiles, fortifying reserves – to raise the costs of any invasion and ensure “Xi has to think twice.”

  • China’s War Against Taiwan Has Already Started – Anne Applebaum (Dec 2022). Explores China’s “cognitive warfare” campaign: propaganda, fake news, and united front tactics designed to demoralize Taiwan without firing a shottheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Applebaum recounts incidents like a 2018 fake-news crisis to illustrate Beijing’s strategy of conquering Taiwanese minds in advance of any military action.

  • Taiwan Faces Its Ukraine Moment – Damir Marusic (Dec 2022). Observes a striking contrast: while Washington is alarmed by Taiwan’s peril, life in Taipei remains “blissfully oblivious”theatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Marusic notes many Taiwanese feel relatively calm (even numb) about China’s threats – a complacency that worries U.S. analysts drawing parallels to Ukraine’s situation.

  • I Went to Taiwan to Say Goodbye – Katherine Hu (Jan 2023). A personal essay reflecting on the author’s trip to see her ailing grandmother amid soaring cross-strait tensions. Hu finds everyday Taiwan astonishingly normal despite ominous headlines. Local calm, she suggests, is not ignorance but resilience – though China’s aggressive military drills and pundits’ talk of war loom in the backgroundtheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com.

  • Beijing Won’t Allow Taiwan’s Democracy to Survive – Michael Schuman (Jan 2024). Published on the eve of Taiwan’s 2024 elections, this article argues that Taiwan’s very existence as a free Chinese democracy is an existential “affront” to Xi Jinpingtheatlantic.comtheatlantic.com. Schuman predicts Xi will intensify pressure on Taiwan and that a “peaceful resolution appears improbable.”

Think Tanks and Policy Reports

  • Brookings – “Should the United States Change Its Policies Toward Taiwan?” (Debate, April 2024): A collection of essay-length “opening statements” and rebuttals from four experts (Michael O’Hanlon, Ivan Kanapathy, Rorry Daniels, Thomas Hanson) examining U.S. strategic optionsbrookings.edu. The debate weighs the pros and cons of maintaining strategic ambiguity vs. moving toward clarity, how to strengthen deterrence, and whether conflict with China over Taiwan is avoidable. Notably, O’Hanlon suggests considering conditional clarity (e.g. a U.S. commitment if China attacks unprovoked), whereas Kanapathy defends the One-China framework’s flexibilitybrookings.edu. Daniels underscores that U.S. Taiwan policy has always evolved with circumstances, and Hanson highlights the need for diplomatic and economic tools (not just military means) to avert warbrookings.edubrookings.edu. This Brookings debate provides a nuanced “menu of options” for U.S. policymakers grappling with an increasingly fraught Taiwan Straitbrookings.edu.

  • Council on Foreign Relations – “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War” (Special Report by Robert Blackwill & Philip Zelikow, Feb 2021). This CFR report warns that the chances of conflict over Taiwan have “grown significantly”cdn.cfr.org and that U.S. strategy is “inadequate to deter or respond” to Chinese aggressioncdn.cfr.org. It recommends the U.S. shore up its capabilities and coordination with allies (especially Japan), while prudently maintaining the One-China policy. Key proposals include negotiating a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement, supporting Taiwan’s participation in international bodies, and building people-to-people ties – all to strengthen Taiwan’s resilience without formally changing its statuscdn.cfr.orgcdn.cfr.org. (Some, like CFR President Richard Haass, felt the report didn’t go far enough – Haass favored moving to strategic claritycdn.cfr.org – while others thought it too bold. Regardless, it has been influential in shaping the debate on Taiwan deterrence.)

  • Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) – “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan” (Report by Mark Cancian et al., Jan 2023). CSIS ran a large series of classified wargames which found that a full-scale PLA invasion of Taiwan could be defeated by a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan coalition – but at tremendous cost. The public report (summarized in major media) concludes the U.S. and Taiwan can thwart China if they urgently improve force posture: more long-range anti-ship missiles, dispersed air bases, and robust reserves on Taiwan. It also notes Taiwan will need to hold out as a “porcupine” in the war’s early weeks until U.S. help arrives. (While not a traditional article, this think-tank study is widely cited for illustrating how bloody and uncertain a Taiwan war would be, reinforcing the importance of deterrence).

  • Quincy Institute – “Paths to Crisis and Conflict: U.S.-China Taiwan Dynamics” – Michael Swaine (Jan 2023). A dove-ish analysis from a former Carnegie Endowment scholar, now at Quincy. Swaine argues that both Washington and Beijing have taken steps heightening the risk of war (U.S. political visits and defense commitments; China’s military posturing and isolation campaign). He maps several plausible escalatory scenarios and urges a “managed strategic stability” approach: mutual tacit limits on military deployments, political talks across the strait, and U.S.-China agreements to avoid incidents. Swaine contends that without concerted diplomacy to accompany deterrence, worst-case assumptions on each side could lead to the conflict everyone wants to avoid. (A notable perspective urging compromise and restraint, contrasting with more hawkish think-tank prescriptions.)

  • RAND Corporation – “Taiwan’s Defense and U.S. Deterrence Strategy” (Various reports 2020–2023). RAND analysts have produced multiple studies on Taiwan’s military balance. One 2020 study highlighted Taiwan’s need to invest in asymmetric warfare (mines, missiles, cyber) over big-ticket jets or ships – a point later echoed by U.S. officials. Another RAND report in 2021 (“China’s Likely Timing and Strategy for Taiwan”) argued that China is unlikely to strike out of the blue; instead it may try to choke Taiwan into submission over time. However, a 2023 update warned that by 2027 the PLA’s improving capabilities could make a lightning invasion more feasible if Xi perceives U.S. resolve wavering. Overall, RAND’s work reinforces that strengthening Taiwan’s self-defense now – and clearly signaling U.S. willingness to fight if necessary – is crucial to preventing Beijing from ever making the fateful decision to attack.

Regional & International Press (English)

  • The Economist (UK): “The Most Dangerous Place on Earth” (Cover story, May 1, 2021). This influential cover declared Taiwan the globe’s most perilous flashpoint. The Economist detailed how China’s military buildup and nationalist rhetoric, paired with U.S. treaty obligations and Taiwan’s democratic resolve, were converging to create the highest risk of great-power war in decades. The stark cover image of Taiwan in crosshairs and the analysis within galvanized global attention on the urgency of shoring up peace in the Strait. (The Economist has since run numerous follow-ups, including analyses of Taiwan’s semiconductor “silicon shield” and editorials urging the West to accelerate military aid to Taiwan without provoking Beijing into rash action.)

  • Nikkei Asia (Japan): “Taiwan Stakes in the Ukraine War” (March 2022). Nikkei Asia drew parallels between Russia-Ukraine and China-Taiwan, noting that Taipei openly cheered Ukraine’s resistance and Beijing studied it closely. This piece included insights from regional experts that Xi Jinping was weighing the costs of an invasion in light of Russia’s struggles and Western sanctions, possibly delaying any Taiwan move but also spurring China to reduce reliance on global trade before any future conflict. Nikkei’s correspondents also highlighted Japan’s shifting stance – Tokyo stated that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency,” signaling support for Taiwan that would have been unthinkable a few years prior.

  • The Guardian (UK): “Taiwan: How an Island in the Spotlight Prepares for the Worst” (Aug 2022). A Guardian long-read that looks at Taiwanese society under the shadow of China’s threats. It covers everything from civil defense drills in Taipei and the popularity of “Air Raid Survival Guide” handbooks, to the morale impact of watching Ukraine’s fight. The piece captures ordinary Taiwanese voices – some defiant, some anxious – and critiques both Chinese aggression and any Western complacency. (The Guardian’s editorial board also published “The Observer View on Taiwan: Cool Heads Needed,” urging careful statecraft from all sides to avoid a war sparked by miscalculation.)

  • South China Morning Post (Hong Kong): “War Games and Warnings: Beijing’s Taiwan Reunification Timeline” (Oct 2022). An SCMP analysis discussing rumors that Xi Jinping set 2027 as a target for resolving the Taiwan issue militarily. It examines Chinese state-media narratives and PLA leakssuggesting impatience. However, it also quotes Chinese experts who insist Beijing prefers peaceful unification and is using psychological warfare to erode Taiwanese will. The article provides a window into PRC strategic thinking (and propaganda) for an international audience – albeit filtered through SCMP’s perspective, which often aligns with Beijing’s official line.

  • The Straits Times (Singapore): “Taiwan on the Frontline of US-China Rivalry” (April 2021). A Singaporean perspective outlining how Taiwan has become a dangerous proxy in the broader superpower contest. It notes that Singapore and other ASEAN countries fear a clash over Taiwan could destabilize all of Asia. The piece strikes a cautionary tone: urging Washington and Beijing to manage tensions wisely and warning that smaller nations will suffer if Taiwan sparks a U.S.-China war. (As a neutral party with close ties to both Washington and Beijing, Singapore’s media often emphasize dialogue and status-quo maintenance on the Taiwan issue.)

  • Mekong Review (Southeast Asia): “Letters from Taipei” (2021–2022, various issues). This regional literary magazine published several reflective essays by writers in Taiwan. Topics ranged from the cultural renaissance of Taiwanese indigenous identity to the island’s vibrant LGBTQ scene – all under the cloud of Chinese saber-rattling. One notable piece, “The Year of Living Anxiously,” recounts the author’s experience of seeing PLA aircraft buzz Taiwan’s ADIZ nearly every day in 2021. Rather than panic, she finds most Taiwanese persist with normal life – studying, creating art, going to night markets – a collective resilience that she suggests may be Taiwan’s quiet strength. Such personal narratives complement the strategic analyses by showing how Taiwan’s people live and cope with the constant threat next door.

  • The Diplomat (International Online): “Taiwan’s Achilles’ Heel: Military Reserves” (June 2022). The Diplomat, an Asia-Pacific affairs outlet, here examines a oft-ignored vulnerability: Taiwan’s reserve force and mobilization system. The article explains how years of recruitment struggles and limited training have left gaps in Taiwan’s defense depth – something Taipei has since started to reform (for example, extending conscription from 4 months to 1 year). It underscores that beyond high-tech weapons like F-16s, readiness and civil defense could make the difference in a drawn-out conflict. (The Diplomat has consistently provided timely coverage of Taiwan’s domestic politics, defense reforms, and regional diplomacy, making it a valuable resource for understanding developments often missed by larger Western media.)

Each of the above entries offers insight into the evolving strategic debate over Taiwan. Together, they reflect a wide spectrum of views – from urgent calls to bolster deterrence at all costs, to pleas for restraint and dialogue – and they chronicle how events from 2020 through 2024 (Hong Kong’s crackdown, COVID-19, the Ukraine war, Pelosi’s visit, Taiwan’s elections) have all reshaped the discourse. This bibliography, grouped by source, provides a comprehensive foundation for understanding the current intellectual, strategic, and policy landscape on Taiwan, as seen through leading news outlets, magazines, and think tanks across the ideological spectrum.

Influential Taiwan-Focused Analyses Cited in Recent Discourse

  • Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China – Charles L. Glaser.Foreign Affairs. April 28, 2021. Glaser’s controversial essay argues that the United States should reconsider its commitments in East Asia, even raising the option of ending the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. Published in 2021, it has since been heavily referenced (and debated) in policy circles, spurring responses that defend maintaining U.S. support for Taiwan.

  • The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan – Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. CSIS Report. January 9, 2023. A landmark Center for Strategic and International Studies report that details the results of 24 war-game simulations of a hypothetical Chinese invasion of Taiwan in 2026. Widely cited in 2023 for its sobering conclusions – the U.S. and Taiwan could blunt an invasion, but at immense cost to all sides csis.org. Its findings about high losses and urgent deterrence needs have shaped current strategic discussions.

  • Can Taiwan Resist a Large-Scale Military Attack by China? – Timothy R. Heath, Sale Lilly, and Eugeniu Han. RAND Corporation Report. June 27, 2023. A detailed RAND research report assessing Taiwan’s capacity to withstand a full-scale Chinese military assault for 90 days. Frequently referenced by analysts in 2023–24, it concludes that Taiwan is highly vulnerable to being overrun within three months absent major improvements or outside help. Its data on Taiwan’s defensive shortfalls (and what it would take to “hold out”) inform many calls for bolstering Taiwan’s self-defense (“porcupine”) strategy.

  • Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense – Lindsay Maizland and Clara Fong. CFR Backgrounder. (Updated) January 21, 2025. A Council on Foreign Relations explainer (regularly updated through 2022–2025) that is often hyperlinked for context in Taiwan articles. It outlines the historical roots of the Taiwan issue, the One-China policy framework, and recent flashpoints (like Pelosi’s 2022 visit) in an accessible format. Major publications and commentators cite this piece to provide readers background on why Taiwan is a potential U.S.–China flashpoint

  • “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes” – M. Taylor Fravel. International Security, Winter 2007/08. Linkbelfercenter.orgbelfercenter.org.
    A foundational academic essay that, while older, is frequently cited in current Taiwan debate for its enduring insight. Fravel analyzes when China decides to use military force in disputes, finding that Beijing is prone to strike if it perceives a closing window of opportunity or a growing vulnerability. His work – cited by analysts like Hal Brands and Michael Beckley– underpins today’s warnings that as China’s relative power peaks, the temptation to resolve the Taiwan question by force could rise.

Each of the above publications has been referenced or hyperlinked in prominent Taiwan policy analyses since 2020, indicating their outsized influence on the evolving discourse around Taiwan’s security and U.S.–China policy. Each combines authoritative research or argumentation with ideas that other experts repeatedly quote or debate in making sense of theTaiwan dilemma.